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Abstract—While prospect of tracking mobile devices’ users is widely
discussed all over European countries to counteract COVID-19 propa-
gation, we propose a Bloom filter based construction providing users’
location privacy and preventing mass surveillance. We apply a solution
based on Bloom filters data structure that allows a 3rd party, a
government agency, to perform some privacy-preserving set relations on
a mobile telco’s access logfile. By computing set relations, the government
agency, given the knowledge of two identified persons, has an instrument
that provides a (possible) infection chain from the initial to the final
infected user no matter at which location on a worldwide scale they are.
The benefit of our approach is that intermediate possible infected users
can be identified and subsequently contacted by the agency. With such
approach, we state that solely identities of possible infected users will be
revealed and location privacy of others will be preserved. To this extent,
it meets General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) requirements in
this area.
Index Terms—mobile user tracking, Bloom filters, set relations, geo-
location harvesting, virus propagation
I. INTRODUCTION
Cases of COVID-19 disease have been reported in more than 190
countries and its spreading has been characterized as pandemic by
the World Health Organization on 11.03.2020. One of its multiple
side effects consists of European democracies being challenged.
Indeed, several countries are collecting location-based data from their
own citizens. The state of emergency for health reasons has been
established in countries as Spain, Portugal, France or Switzerland.
Such a specific situation empowers a government to perform actions
that would normally not be allowed to undertake. For instance, in
Milano, Italy, mobile network operators are providing information on
users’ traffic to public authorities. In Germany, issues regarding how
and for which usage to process the location-based information are
ones of the most discussed. Indeed, efforts in Germany are twofold
regarding digital support to detect infection chains. First, with an app
Corona-Warn-App deployed and downloaded more than 15 millions
times in Germany (population of approx. 83 millions). It consists
of using a tracking app with Bluetooth in which a smartphone of
an infected user is subsequently informing all devices which have
been in proximity (within the beaconing received range at some point
in time in the past). Such an approach is very vulnerable due to
the requirement of continuously activated Bluetooth. The recently
published families of BIAS [1] or BlueBorne [2] attacks have shown
that mobile devices with activated Bluetooth can easily be remotely
executed, e.g. CVE-2017-0781, CVE-2017-0782 or CVE-2017-14315
and are classified as a severe risk. Moreover, it has been pointed out
that the harvesting of contacts via Bluetooth with a tracking app is
only properly working in case the app is activated continuously in
the foreground, and, moreover, that at least 60% of the smartphone
users need to download and continuously use it to indeed have an
impact with respect to the identification of infection chains.
Second, telco operators would provide access logfiles of mobile
network base stations to RKI (Robert-Koch-Institute) to support
inferring infection chains.
On the contrary, the Netherlands’ government decided to not
approve a general confinement, for the reason of being incompatible
with individual freedom.
For these reasons, in the work at hand we attempt to propose
a construction which combine the efficiency to help the public
authorities to contain the virus spreading with the possibility to
provide privacy with respect to the citizens. Therefore, we concentrate
on providing a privacy-preserving solution for the 2nd effort currently
done within Germany. Our proposed solution makes use of our
previous works [3], [4] which allows a non-trusted third party to
privately compute operations and relations on sets using Bloom filters
data structure. Such data structure allows one to represent a large
set of elements in a simple tabular of bits which could provides
obfuscation and privacy on the set.
We recall that GDPR’s two main objectives are to firstly enhance
the personal data protection by processing them and to secondly
empower the companies in charge of this processing procedure.
Even if this regulation does not apply on fields as public health or
national security [5], weaving the proposed Bloom filter based private
protocols into infection chains investigation would limit government
agencies to solely identify users with high probability of being
infected instead of a massive data analysis of all mobile users.
A. Related Work
Several approaches from related work allow one to perform compu-
tations on pseudonymized, obfuscated or even encrypted data without
the need to discern them. We could list homomorphic encryption
[6], [7] or multi-party computation [8], [9] which represent the
mainly investigated techniques. In [10], we applied our Bloom filter
based construction to several use cases of post-mortem mobile device
tracking. In our former work [4], we have shown that this alternative
approach based on Bloom filter could be used to secure data while
preserving the ability of performing relevant tests or computations
on the private data. Bloom filters have been used in many different
scenarios as presented in [11]. For instance, Kerschbaum directly
encrypts the Bloom filter with homomorphic encryption [7]. In [12]
authors applied the Bloom filter to key exchange mechanisms in
wireless sensor network (WSN) environment while in [13], authors
optimize the sensor nodes broadcasting with the use of Bloom filters.
Regarding the investigation of privacy-preserving location tracing
solutions in the environment of COVID-19 spreading, we could
mention the work of PEPP-PT consortium [14]. This European team
provide standards, technology, and services to countries and devel-
opers with the objective to help stopping the COVID-19 spreading.
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II. SCENARIO
A government agency, which role is to reduce the spreading of the
SARS-CoV-2 virus in its country, knows different pairs of infected
persons (A,B). Its objective here, is to identify all the possible paths
which relies user A to user B and considers the case where infection
of user B is a consequence of user A’s infection. By retrieving all
possible paths (surely it could also turn out that no path exists and
the infection of users A and B was unrelated), the agency could
identify all the users within this path that may be also infected by
the virus and try to contact them. Indeed, different mobile device’s
users close to the same mobile base station at the same time could
potentially spread the virus in case of one being infected. To do so, the
agency is analyzing connection data provided by a telco company.
The connection logs are collected on the base stations which are
providing network access to the users’ mobile devices.
A. Parties Involved.
Four parties are involved in the scenario:
Users: could be infected by the SARS-CoV-2 virus. They are con-
necting to the base stations to access the mobile network.
Telco company: provides network to the users via several base
stations. It also provides log data from the network connections
to government agencies.
Base stations: are distributed over several countries, provide net-
work to the users’ mobile devices and collect connection data.
Government agency: aims to identify ”infection chains” in order to
contact the possible infected users and counteract the COVID-19
disease pandemic.
B. Collecting Connection Data
For each base station j, the telco company firstly generates and
initializes a fresh Bloom filter BFj represented by a tabular of bits, all
set to 0. Any time a user is connecting to the mobile network using
base station j, the following connection information is aggregated
and added to BFj :
(idi, t
1
i , t
2
i )
with idi the user’s credentials and t1i and t
2
i respectively the starting
and ending times of its connection to the access point. Such con-
nection data should be considered as sensitive regarding the location
privacy of the users. As it will be presented, we consider a Bloom
filter-based approach which brings privacy to the stored data. Indeed,
on the one hand the base stations are using usernames to characterize
the users and on the other hand only the telco company could generate
and access the connection information from the base stations.
C. Proximity Chain - Infection Chain
As notation rule, we use 〈〉 to express proximity chains and [] for
infection chains.
A proximity chain consists of a list of users where two successive
ones have been at the same location at the same time. To establish a
proximity chain, these times of contact should be ordered. In other
words, in the proximity chain 〈A,D,F,E,B〉, the time at which
users A and D have been at the same location should precede the
one for users D and F (i.e. [t1A; t
2
A]∩ [t1D; t2D] < [t1D; t2D]∩ [t1F ; t2F ]).
In addition to be defined as a proximity chain, the list could also
represent an infection chain. In this case, all the users composing the
chain should have a probability of being infected Pr(Xi) greater
than a certain threshold Tr. More concretely, an infection chain
[A,X1, . . . , Xn, B] is a proximity chain for which it holds that:
∀ Xi : Pr(Xi) > Tr, otherwise it is solely a proximity chain.
Therefore, an infection chain [A,X1, . . . , Xn, B] represents how the
SARS-CoV-2 virus may have spread from an initially infected user
A to a consecutive infected user B.
It may happen that one or several subsets of a proximity chain
〈A,X1, . . . , Xn, B〉 are considered as infection chains, e.g.
[A,X1, . . . , Xi] and/or [Xj , . . . , B].
D. Adversary Model:
We consider the government agency as the principal threat for the
application’s users. As we stated previously, even if GDPR does not
apply on public health security matters, we aim to apply limitations
on government agencies. In such a way, we would like that the
agencies could only identify users with high probability of being
infected instead of having a massive data analysis of all mobile
users. As we will present in the following sections, having the telco
company colluding with the government would allow the agency to
access personal data of all users and therefore we do not consider
such assumption.
Even if we do not get any collision, we could also precise that
users are not trusting the telco company. Indeed, they seek to limit
the mobile devices to collect personal data as much as possible.
We also consider that users do not trust any approaches that require
to maintain Bluetooth continuously on since multiple types of attacks
could occur as by example remote code executions from Bleedingbit
vulnerabilities [15].
III. BLOOM FILTERS-BASED APPROACH
As recently proposed in [4], the Bloom filter data construction
could allow to privately represent sets of elements and at the same
time enable performance-saving computation on them. Exactly due
to this performance-saving privacy extension, we argue that our
approach also suits for such massive data sets like mobile access
logfiles. At next, we give a background on Bloom filters and the
relevant set relation and recall the basic protocol’s functions.
A. Bloom Filters
A Bloom filter is a data structure introduced by Burton Howard
Bloom in 1970 [16]. It is used to represent a set of elements. With
a Bloom filter representing a certain set, one can verify whether an
element is a member of this set. Such a data structure consists of
a tabular of m bits which is associated to k public hash functions.
At first, all the m bits are initialized to 0. To add an element to the
Bloom filter, one has to compute the hashes of this element with
each of respective k hash functions. Then, set the bit to 1 for each
position corresponding to a hash value. To test whether one element
is included in the Bloom filter, one has, similarly, to compute the
respective hash values of this element and verify if the respective bits
are set to 1. If at least one of these bits is set to 0, then we know for
sure that the tested element is not a member of the set represented by
the Bloom filter (i.e. no false negative could append when testing an
element). On the contrary, with some (minor) probability, the testing
function could retrieve a false positive. Indeed, even if all the bits
that have been verified are set to 1, the tested element may not be
part of the set represented by the Bloom filter.
B. Set Relations
Multiple types of operations could be performed on sets. For
privacy concerns it could be of interest to solely reveal the cardinality
of the resulting set instead of its content. Therefore, we propose a
solution on adapted Bloom filters (see III-C) to use one kind of set
relations namely the inclusiveness defined as follows:
Definition 1 (Inclusiveness): Let A and B be finite sets. We
consider A included in B, i.e. A ⊂ B, iff all elements from A are
included in B : ∀a ∈ A : a ∈ B.
C. Private Protocols
To guarantee full privacy of the sets’ content along with their
cardinality, we proposed in [4] to modify the Bloom filters approach
in two aspects. Firstly, instead of using k public hash functions, we
are using a unique HMAC function with k secret keys. Secondly, the
exact value of k is kept secret and is privately and randomly generated
within two publicly known boundaries. We specify the functions
regarding the initialization phase and the inclusiveness protocol.
1) Initialization.:
h,k,m,K←Setup: The telco company should first choose and
generate the Bloom filter parameters: the dimension m, the
HMAC function h, the amount of keys k and the set of keys
K = {κ1, . . . , κk}.
BFA ←Create(h,m,K,A): Generates the Bloom filter of the data
set A = {a1, . . . , anA}.
2) Inclusiveness Protocol.: This operator allows to verify if one
set is included in another. It performs directly on the Bloom filters
of the respective sets. This operator is defined as:
BFA⊆B ← INC(BFA,BFB): For each index, we set 0 if at the
same index we have 1 for BFA and 0 for BFB and we set 1
otherwise.
This operator is equivalent to the bitwise binary operator combina-
tion:
INC(BFA, BFB) ≡ ¬(BFA) OR BFB (1)
Then we express the number of bits set to 1 in the resulting Bloom
filter. If it is equal to m, we can conclude that A ⊆ B if no false
positive occurred. Otherwise we get A * B with certainty.
For an evaluation of the correctness and the security of this
protocol, we refer the readers to [3]. It is shown that a proper selection
of parameters m and k considering the number of elements to be
inserted, guarantees the limitation of overlapping bits in the resulting
Bloom filter and enables the 3rd party to correctly conclude on the
inclusiveness property of the two sets. Indeed, a too large amount of
overlapping bits in the resulting Bloom filter would lead to a case of
false negative.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION
From any two given infected users A and B, the govern-
ment agency first aims to identify all the proximity chains
〈A, idX1 , . . . , idXn , B〉. In our protocol, we recall that the telco
company provides all the relevant Bloom filters to the government
agency. We propose to dissociate three cases:
• CASE 1: the smallest possible proximity chain 〈A,B〉:
there is a base station BSj and a Bloom filter BFA,B for set
{A,B} and INC(BFj , BFA,B) = true.
Since both users A and B are indeed infected, the proximity
chain 〈A,B〉 is also an infection chain [A,B].
• CASE 2: a proximity chain with one intermediate user X
〈A, idX , B〉:
there is a base station BSj1 and a Bloom filter BFA,idX
for set {A, idX} where INC(BFj1 , BFA,idX ) = true and
in addition, there is a base station BSj2 and a Bloom filter
BFidX ,B for set {idX , B} and INC(BFj2 , BFidX ,B) = true.
We remark here that we know users A and B but we do not
know user X nor his access credential idX , so the government
agency has to search in all base stations for all Xj for which
the above two inclusiveness tests INC hold.
If Pr(idX) > Tr we can denote [A, idX , B].
• CASE 3: the general case 〈A, idX1 , . . . , idXn , B〉:
we have INC(BFj1 , BFA,idX1 ) = true ∧ . . . ∧
INC(BFjn , BFidXn ,B) = true.
Our solution consists of having the government agency building a
data tree structure representing all the proximity chains starting from
user A. From this tree, the agency could easily identify the proximity
chains from user A to user B. For the next step of the protocol,
the government agency has to evaluate the chain to determine its
plausibility to actually be an infection chain. We give the outlines
of this step but not its evaluation function that we save for the
epidemiologists.
We emphasize that at this point, the proximity or infection chains
will only reveal usernames of users X1, . . . , Xn and not their real
identities. At the very end of the protocol, the government agency
will request from the telco company the identities of the intermediate
infected users.
A. Generating the Proximity Tree
To obtain a proximity tree, the government agency starts by
creating an empty tree T with user A as root. Then, it processes the
recursive algorithm prox tree(A,A,B, t′) presented in Algorithm
1 with t′ the time from when user A could have started the infection
process. The recursive algorithm does as follow: first, it generates
the list BSN of base stations that the current node N has been
connected to at a time later than t. To test if a user N has been
connected to a base station j (i.e. test if (idN , t1j , t
2
j ) ∈ BFj), the
government agency receives from the telco company all the Bloom
filters composed of each of the 3-tuples (idN , t1j , t
2
j ). Then, the
government agency performs the inclusiveness testing between the
received Bloom filters and BFi, the Bloom filter corresponding to
the connections logfile from BSj as: INC(BFN,j , BFi). The next
step of the algorithm consists of identifying all the users that visited
the base stations from set BSN at the same moment than user N . As
before, the telco company generates Bloom filters with the 3-tuples
(idl, t
1
l , t
2
l ) for all users l and all time ranges [t
1
l ; t
2
l ] that overlap the
connection time of user N . To determine which users should be listed,
the government agency performs the inclusiveness operator between
these Bloom filters and BFN the one composed by the elements
from BSN . Finally, for every identified users, they are added to the
proximity tree T as a leaf of current node N and Algorithm 1 is then
recursively processed on the leaves.
An additional aspect to take into account while recursively process-
ing the algorithm is to consider the upper nodes of the current node
in the proximity tree. Indeed, we would like to avoid creating some
loops in the tree which are irrelevant when dealing with infection
problems; if user A infected user C, it makes no sense to consider
user C infecting user A in short period of time. The algorithm should
then exclude all the users which are already inserted as upper nodes
in the tree. Regarding the tree construction, if we consider that user
C has been in proximity of user A and idC is added as a leaf of
root A, user A should not be considered anymore as potential leaf
of node idC and so on.
In Figure 1 we give a toy example of our recursive algo-
rithm with seven users A,B,C,D,E, F,G, three base stations
BSj1 , BSj2 , BSj3 and times as integers in [0; 24]. We show the
content of connection logfiles from the three base stations and the
proximity tree from user A to user B that has been generated by
computing prox tree(A,A,B, 0). We observe in Figure 1 that two
users might be in contact around different base stations. Indeed, the
Algorithm 1 prox tree(N,A,B, t)
Require: a node N from a tree T, users A and B, a time t
Ensure: a tree T
1: if N = B then
2: break
3: end if
4: for all BFj do
5:
6: for all t1j , t2j > t do
7:
8: if (idN , t1j , t2j ) ∈ BFj then
9: BSN .add((BSj , t
1
j , t
2
j ))
10: end if
11: end for
12: end for
13: for all (BSNk, t1Nk, t2Nk) ∈ BSN do
14:
15: for all idl do
16:
17: for all (t1l , t2l ) | (t1l 6 t1Nk ∧ t2l > t1Nk) ∨ (t2l > t2Nk
∧ t1l 6 t2Nk) ∨ (t1l 6 t2Nk ∧ t2l > t1Nk) do
18:
19: if (idl, t1l , t2l ) ∈ BFNk then
20: createLeaf(idl)
21: prox tree(idl, A,B,max(t
1
Nk, t
1
l ))
22: end if
23: end for
24: end for
25: end for
26: if N.leaf = ∅ then
27: break
28: end if
resulting proximity chains are 〈A,C,G,B〉, 〈A,G,B〉 (with users
A and G in proximity around BSj1 ), 〈A,G,B〉 (with users A and G
in proximity around BSj3 ) and 〈A,B〉. In case there are evaluated
as infection chains, users C and G might also be infected.
BFj1={ (idA , 0, 6), (idC , 2, 9), (idG , 3, 5), (idD , 7, 10)}
BFj2={ (idA , 8, 17), (idD , 15, 18)}
BFj3={ (idF , 2, 11), (idE , 6, 15), (idG , 8, 24), (idA , 18, 24), (idB , 18, 20)}
A
(idC , j1) (idG , j1) (idD , j2) (idG , j3) (idB , j3)
(idG , j1) (idD , j1) (idC , j1)(idF , j3) (idB , j3)
(idF , j3) (idE , j3) (idB , j3) (idD , j1)
(idF , j3)
(idE , j3)(idB , j3)
(idF , j3)
Figure 1. Example of connection logfiles from three base stations and the
respective proximity tree obtained from prox tree(A,A,B, 0). It outcomes
three different proximity chains 〈A,C,G,B〉, 〈A,G,B〉 and 〈A,B〉.
a) Algorithm optimization: With respect to performance, one
could consider computing the algorithm on the opposite way, namely
with input B as root. To do so, the algorithm should be modified so
that time is considered backwards. It starts at ending time (24 for our
toy example) and we build the proximity tree by going back in time.
We consider as reverse prox tree this reverse recursive algorithm.
In Figure 2 we show the proximity tree obtained after computing
reverse prox tree(B,A,B, 24) from user B considering the time
backwards. As expected, the resulting proximity chains are the same
than in Figure 1 but we remark that the resulting tree is smaller than
the one obtained in Figure 1. In this specific toy example we notice
that obtaining the proximity tree was made faster by reversing our
algorithm.
B
(idA , j3) (idG , j3)
(idA , j3) (idE , j3) (idF , j3)
(idF , j3)
(idA , j1) (idC , j1)
(idA , j1)
Figure 2. Example of a proximity tree obtained from
reverse prox tree(B,A,B, 24) with the same toy example than
Figure 1. It generates three different proximity chains 〈A,C,G,B〉,
〈A,G,B〉 and 〈A,B〉.
Another aspect we could consider while comparing the two
resulting trees, is that the order the tree is being build and the
proximity chain obtained is also reversed. Indeed, in Figure 1 we
obtain first 〈A,C,G,B〉 then 〈A,G,B〉 (via j1), 〈A,G,B〉 (via j3)
and finally 〈A,B〉. In Figure 2 we see that we obtain the chains in
the exact opposite order with reverse prox tree. Still aiming to
optimize the computation time of our algorithm, in particular when
dealing with large numbers of users and base stations, one could
simultaneously start the tree generation using the algorithm and its
reversed version. For both cases the tree propagates and every time
we find a proximity chain in the tree (meaning N = B or N = A
for reverse prox tree) we could store the chain in a set S (or S′
for reverse prox tree). Then for each round (i.e for iteration) we
test if the two sets have a common element. If not, we continue.
In case they have a common proximity chain, we could stop both
algorithms and the complete set of proximity chains from users A to
B is composed of the addition of sets S and S′.
To illustrate the approach of computing both versions at the same
time and, as argued, gain on performance, one could explain:
• if you throw one stone into the water and you want the resulting
waves to reach a point in r meters distance, then the circle at
the end will encompass many square meters.
• if you throw two stones into the water (one at the original
position, the other one at the position you want to reach), the
intersection of the resulting waves propagation will be approx.
at a distance r/2 meters.
• adding the area of these two circles shall be much smaller than
the circle’s area obtained with one stone.
For example, with A = pi × r2 and r = 10 A = 314.159, and with
r = 5 the area of the two circles is altogether approximately 160!
Another level of optimization could be considered in order to
identify some of the proximity chains faster as for instance to support
the start of a localized quarantine immediately. Instead of storing the
chains into S and S′, at each propagation round we look at the chains
while they are processed so that we stop both algorithms when:
• prox tree has built a path 〈A,X1, . . . , Xi〉
• reverse prox tree has built a path 〈B,Xn, . . . , Xj〉
• and it holds Xi == Xj
Then the two parts of the proximity chain could be concatenated to
create the proximity chain 〈A,X1, . . . , Xi == Xj , . . . , Xn, B〉
We could refer to Table I to see that if we perform both algorithms
at the same time in the toy example configuration, we could retrieve
the proximity chain 〈A,C,G,B〉 faster with this second level of
optimization.
In Table I we could observe in detail how we retrieve the
proximity chains using the two versions of Algorithm 1 and the
optimization with the toy example’s configuration. As stated pre-
viously, reverse prox tree(B,A,B, 24) was executed way faster
than prox tree(A,A,B, 0). Indeed, the original algorithm ended af-
ter 18 rounds while the reverse one stopped after the 9th round. Since
it is not possible to predict which of the two will finish processing
first, computing both in parallel will optimize the retrieving. As for
the second level of optimization, concatenating two parts of proximity
chains allows to retrieve 〈A,C,G,B〉 at round 2 while discovered
at round 6 with prox tree and round 9 with reverse prox tree.
It is of value especially when proximity chains are composed by a
high number of intermediate users.
The performance gain obtained with our two levels of optimization
is downplayed due to the extreme smallness of logfiles in our toy
example. One could easily imagine that applied to real life scenario
and big data these optimizations are highly performance saving. For
example, in another scenario dealing with mobile connection logfiles
[10], authors propose to process on these logfiles and therefore Bloom
filters up to 106 elements.
b) Algorithm decentralization: The European PEPP-PT consor-
tium is advocating a decentralized approach as well as the DP3T
protocol [17] which relies on Bluetooth, and also as [18] where de-
centralization has been investigated. With our presented optimization,
we could integrate such construction by introducing two additional
parties besides the ones already presented. We precise that these
two additional parties should be extremely powerful in terms of
computation and perform parallel computing such as server farms
or clusters:
• Computing party 1 which runs prox tree
• Computing party 2 which runs reverse prox tree
This way the agency is only receiving per round the values for Xi
(from computing party 1) and Xj (from computing party 2) and
comparing if Xi == Xj . Only in the case Xi == Xj we obtain that
computing party 1 is sending 〈A,X1, . . . , Xi〉 and computing party
2 sending 〈Xj , . . . , Xn, B〉 to the agency. With such a construction,
multiple parties are involved in the computation and the whole effort
does not rely on the government agency.
c) Algorithm complexity: One could easily see by analyzing the
obtained results in Figures 1 and 2 that the size of the resulting tree
will depend on the size of the base stations’ logfiles. These logfiles
will naturally depend on the amount of users and thus connections
during the particular time. The more base stations and users there
are, the more logfiles will be numerous and fully filled. In our toy
example, we have 11 connection entries in all combined base stations
as displayed in Figure 1. They result in a tree with respectively 19
and 10 nodes by computing prox tree and reverse prox tree. We
also recall that in case we find the final user of the wanted infection
chain (user B in our example) in the tree, the algorithm reaches a
break instruction and therefore the respective sub-tree is no longer
explored. A high activity of this particular user could then reduce
the tree’s spreading. As seen previously, one of the two algorithms
will be faster to execute without being able to predict which one and
applying the presented optimization could reduce the complexity to
the faster one.
B. Proximity Chain Evaluation
From all the proximity chains 〈A, idX1 , . . . , idXn , B〉 obtained
by performing the aforementioned protocol, the government agency
should determine if users Xi might also be infected. To do so, the
agency could estimate the users’ probability of being infected and
compare it to a threshold (i.e. Pr(Xi) > Tr). Such a probability
obviously depends, among others, on the respective neighbors within
the chain. We consider the probability value computed as a function
infection(previous node, contact time, contact distance,
reproduction number, saturation) where saturation shall denote
the percentage of infected persons within the human population of a
region, which obviously changes over time.
More precisely, in Germany the reproduction number R, which is
defined as the mean number of people infected by a case, was 3 at
the beginning of the COVID-19 crisis and by 17.04.2020 could be
reduced to 0.7 (and meanwhile R = 1.1). Clearly this number is
only an average but still indicates that inference from a proximity
chain to an infection chain very much depends on the concrete time
and location entities met during the pandemic wave. Similar numbers
also exist for other countries as for instance R = 0.8 for Belgium at
17.04.2020. Another important observation is that since a proximity
chain can easily build up over a period of weeks, Pr(Xi) may
significantly vary. But only if all probabilities are larger than Tr
the agency can at least argue having identified a possible infection
chain.
It goes without saying that it is out of scope to determine the
infection function. On the one hand, specialists emphasize the
high contagiousness of the virus but on the other hand, having two
users connecting to the same base station at the same time does not
necessarily imply any physical contact between the two.
Without being able to determine the exact probability of a user to
be infected by another one, we could propose a model to evaluate
the probability of a proximity chain becoming an infection chain.
First, we know that users A and B are infected and we would
like to determine if user B has been infected due to user A or
via another chain and other infection events. Therefore, applying
probability theory to such a problem is relevant and reflects the chain
characteristic of it.
We define as Pr(Xi) the following conditional probability
P (Xi|Xi−1) of the event ”Xi−1 has infected Xi knowing that Xi−1
is already infected”. It holds that Pr(X1∩· · ·∩ Xn) =
n∏
i=1
Pr(Xi).
Considering a proximity chain 〈A,X1, . . . , Xn, B〉, there is a clear
tendency that the overall probability to have user B infected due
to user A is inversely proportional to the length of the proximity
chain. We propose the following probability model for evaluating a
proximity chain:
For each 〈A,X1, . . . , Xn, B〉, if ∀i ∈ [1;n]Pr(Xi) ≥ Tr
then [A,X1, . . . , Xn, B] (2)
The proximity tree obtained at the previous stage of the protocol
contains nodes with users’ credentials and only these usernames are
revealed. It is only in case a proximity chain turns out to be an
infection chain, that the agency will request from the telco company
the real identities of the users composing the chain. Therefore, users’
identity are solely revealed in case of infection function outcomes
so. Moreover, we recall that during the overall process no additional
location information of other users listed in the mobile operator’s
logfile are revealed to the agency.
Table I
CONSTRUCTION OF THE PROXIMITY TREE ROUND BY ROUND WITH prox tree AND reverse prox tree AND HOW THE OPTIMIZATION COULD BE
APPLIED.
Round prox tree reverse prox tree With optimization
1 C A, 〈A,B〉 〈A,B〉 from reverse prox tree.
from reverse prox tree.
2 G G 〈A,C,G,B〉 from concatenation of 〈A,C,G〉 from
prox tree and 〈G,B〉 from reverse prox tree.
3 F A, 〈A,G,B〉 〈A,G,B〉 from reverse prox tree.
4 E E
5 F F
6 B, 〈A,C,G,B〉 F
7 D A, 〈A,G,B〉 〈A,G,B〉 from reverse prox tree.
8 G C
9 C A, 〈A,C,G,B〉
. . . . . . . . .
14 B, 〈A,G,B〉 -
. . . . . . . . .
17 B, 〈A,G,B〉 -
18 B, 〈A,B〉 -
Another way to tune prox tree and make the overall computation
more salable could be, during the computation of prox tree and
reverse prox tree, to only consider such paths in the proximity
tree as long as they still fit the criterion to also be an infection chain.
It could consists of having the testing from equation (2) at line 20
from Algorithm 1 and a break instruction in case the test is not
fulfilled.
C. Recursivity of the Infection Detection
One may notice that a trivial optimization would be to switch
users A and B in the sense that “infection of user A is coming
from user B”. In Figure 3 we show the proximity tree obtained
from our algorithm by computing prox tree(B,B,A, 0) with our
toy example logfiles. We notice that it results in a very different
tree than in Figure 1 obtained by prox tree(A,A,B, 0). In case the
government agency holds some information on the infection time of
users A and B, for example that user A has been infected before
user B, only one direction should be considered by the agency.
B
(idA , j3) (idG , j3)
(idA , j1)
Figure 3. Example of a proximity tree from user B to user A obtained from
prox tree(B,B,A, 0). It results in two different proximity chains 〈B,A〉
and 〈B,G,A〉.
To be the most efficient, the government agency should perform
a final step in the protocol. All the users identified as infected at
the previous stage (i.e. all Xi where Pr(Xi) > Tr) should be
considered as new users A and respectively B in the proposed
solution. Indeed, our protocol is initiated with users tuples (A,B)
already identified as infected by the agency. The freshly identified
users are thus incrementing the list of known infected persons and
the protocol should be applied to them to optimize the search. In such
a way, the most infected users could be identified and contacted.
D. Discussion on Location Privacy
We argue that the proposed solution provides privacy for the users
by three different means. Firstly by using only personal credentials
as usernames and secondly thanks to the Bloom filter’s construction
and its obfuscation feature. Indeed, as explained previously, the real
identities of users are not provided and stored in the Bloom filters
nor the logfiles. The telco company uses usernames to distinguish
users and the private mapping will be provided to the government
agency solely on-demand, when a user is identified as being part of
an infection chain.
The second aspect of location privacy is given by the Bloom filters
based approach from [4] which allows to compute relations among
logfiles while keeping these data sets private. We recall that such
an approach uses an HMAC function instead of a bunch of public
hash functions and therefore only the telco company could create
the Bloom filters and no other party. To this extent, the government
agency could not try to retrieve locations of a specific user by
generating a Bloom filter with a unique element and performs the
inclusiveness relation between this Bloom filter and the ones from
base stations. For that reason, using secret keys to generate a valid
Bloom filter enhances the privacy aspect of the protocol. Finally we
recall that secret keys are generated and stored only at the telco
company side and are not required by the government agency to
perform our protocol.
The third aspect of location privacy consists of having no other
party than the provider itself (which anyhow has this information)
gets the location data of the users. This can be easily done by not
revealing which BFi comes from which BSi. This way, the only
information revealed to the authority is the contact information of
users having entered the same cell during the same time interval.
Providing the concrete location information of this cell is totally
irrelevant for the authority to compute the proximity resp. infection
chain.
V. CONCLUSION
We proposed in this work to use the Bloom filter approach from
[4] for a real life use case, similarly to [10] where we applied
it to a post-mortem mobile device tracking scenario. Our detailed
protocol supports a government agency to track possible COVID-
19 infection chains and therefore identify plausible infected mobile
users. Throughout the entire protocol, the agency will only handle
usernames which do not allow to retrieve the users’ identities and
therefore their privacy will be preserved. Solely in the case of possible
infection by the life-threatening SARS-CoV-2 virus, real identities
will be revealed to the agency, that will be able to contact them
and provide medical support. In such way, the telco companies act
GDPR compliant and could still guarantee a certain level of location
privacy to their clients. We could stress that if data stem from the ‘in
proximity’ mobile telco’s logfile, it means that two devices have been
in the same transmission range of a base station. In the worst case
they can still have a 2×r distance (easily 500 m or more). However, if
the same approach can be applied to the RSSI based Swarm-mapping
approach for Android or iOS collected data then ‘in proximity’ has a
much better accuracy [19]. In particular also the WiFiLocationHarvest
file of each mobile device contains timestamp, latitude, longitude,
trip-id, speed, course at an amazing accuracy which comes close to
the accuracy required to check if two devices got nearer than 2 m
(infection distance). And, moreover, compared to the promoted App
based approach with Bluetooth from Germany Fraunhofer Institutes
and others in the RSSI based approach the mobile’s WLAN and
Bluetooth can be off, and yet, simply due to the measured RSSI
from the access point the approach provides the location data of the
devices equipped with such modern mobile operating systems.
To conclude, our approach may be a good starting point for
debating a reasonable GDPR compliant detection of COVID-19
infection chains since we argue it does not provide additional privacy-
leakage to other parties than those who already have the knowledge
of our location data.
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